It is astonishing to see more and more services built on user-oriented data, providing numerous tools to improve ones daily life. Nowadays, data collected from numerous sources is being used to monitor daily activities, i.e., monitoring patients. These innovations allow for more cost-efficient and scalable solutions. Nevertheless, these types of services can pose a threat to the privacy of individuals due to the possibility of leaking highly privacy-sensitive data. Therefore, it is essential to design such systems in a privacy-preserving manner. Inspired by a real-life project in the health-care domain, we propose to secure the data using encryption, while enabling the involved parties to run queries directly on this encrypted data. A vital component of such a system is searching for specific data entries within a large dataset. In this work, we present two cryptographic protocols that complete such a query by creating an encrypted vector in a simulation secure way. These vectors consist of a 1 for intended database entry, whereas other items would be represented as a 0. By creating index tables before the execution of the queries, it has become possible to execute a search query with high performance. As we show in our analyses, it takes less than one second to find the matching encrypted data-entry within a database with 100K records. Our proposal is generic, can be applied to several application domains, and practically compared to similar works.
INTRODUCTION
A real-life problem motivates the work presented in this paper: A hospital wants to monitor its patients using off-the-shelf smart devices (Treskes et al., 2017) that measure, among other things, a patient's weight, ECG, blood pressure, and blood sugar level. These devices connect to the smartphone of a patient, who needs to be monitored on a daily basis. A mobile application then sends the measurements to the central server of the vendor. Afterward, the hospital can use a web-based application to check the measurements for any particular patient. The primary reasons to use such a system are straight-forward: scalability and cost reduction (Goldschmidt, 2005) .
Unfortunately, the whole system relies on the assumption that the vendor is trust-worthy and it has a secure method to protect against both internal and external attackers. All recent incidents show that this is not yet the case (Meingast et al., 2006) . Currently, it is possible for a hacker to break into the data servers and steal privacy-sensitive medical data, such an attacker can either be a malicious employee or someone who makes a genuine mistake (Johnson, 2009) . It is essential to propose a system where sensitive data are protected while enabling medical institutions to monitor their patients remotely.
In order to create a secure system with this layout, we propose to encrypt measurements directly on the smartphone of the user before sending them to the vendor. We aim to encrypt the data using a homomorphic encryption scheme which enables data processing while encrypted, without revealing the content of data to the vendor or any third party. More precisely, what is needed for the above system is to identify a patient, or a group of patients, with specific conditions, e.g., people with high blood pressure within a particular time period. Provided that we require semantic security, it is challenging to find all the data for given conditions, since it requires 'searching through the encrypted database. ' Searching in encrypted databases has been a challenge for researchers for many decades. Proposed solutions vary in the cryptographic tools used for encrypting data. Examples include: schemes built on attribute-based encryption (Bethencourt et al., 2007) , homomorphic encryption (Chung et al., 2010) and special constructions such as Oblivious RAMS (Ostrovsky, 1990; Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996) . The focus has been on improving efficiency; the current state-of-the-art is not as practical as searching within a plaintext database where different techniques can be 270 used to speed up the search function (e.g., creating hash tables). Therefore, there is a need for further research to achieve higher efficiency.
Inspired by the medical application, in this work, we assume that patients have a smartphone, which can collect measurements from one or more smart devices. The data is then sent to the vendor's storage unit, which can either be a local or cloud-based database. More interestingly, a patient might utilize different smart devices from different vendors. The hospital that wants to monitor a specific patient, or a group of patients, should be able to retrieve the related data without leaking information to any of the vendors. This application setting is challenging for three reasons: 1) we want to enable hospitals to retrieve data on sophisticated queries, 2) we also assume multiple devices from different vendors and 3) the amount of data collected from the patients is significantly large. To achieve our goal, we need to identify the data entries, which are all encrypted, that match the query provided by the hospital. More precisely, we assume that there is a global (virtual) database with encrypted entries from all devices. Given that database, we want to create an encrypted, binary vector such that a vector element is 1 for corresponding database entry and 0, for all other tuples. Given such an encrypted binary vector, it is possible to build numerous services such as i) generating statistics (i.e., counting, averaging), ii) data aggregation, and iii) private data retrieval.
To obtain such a vector, we present two cryptographic protocols for secure searching, IBSvI and IBSvII. In IBSvI, we propose a computation-wise efficient searching protocol. In IBSvII, the computation of generating the encrypted binary vector is performed in one party. However, IBSvII introduces more computational overhead. These protocols rely on creating index tables and updating them with each input received from a device. The index tables are then used later to execute queries and find specific database entries at significantly lower cost. Our proposal has several advantages over existing works: 1) our protocols are designed for numerical data, in contrast to current work that relies on exact match, 2) our proposal supports conjunction queries with "AND", 3) our proposal is simulation secure; it leaks no private information including search pattern and access pattern to the involved entities, and 4) our protocols enable generating statistics from encrypted data based on the given conditions.
RELATED WORK
Ostrovsky and Goldreich (Ostrovsky, 1990; Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996) introduced ORAM where it is possible to evaluate any query, while the access pattern is kept hidden. ORAM lets users upload their private data to a remote storage in encrypted form, and still have random access to their data in a secure way. However, ORAM allows users to access only one entry at a time with a logarithmic number of communication rounds for each read. Moreover, in ORAM, users should know the location of the data that they are looking for in the database. Later works (Song et al., 2000; Goh, 2003; Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005) proposed more efficient ways of searching by using weaker security models. Song et al. (Song et al., 2000) introduced a private key based searching that is communication-wise more efficient than ORAM. The secure searching in (Song et al., 2000) is based on generating and storing a two-layer ciphertext in the remote storage unit. Although the introduced encryption scheme by Song et al. is proven to be secure, the searching procedure reveals the access pattern. Similarly, Stefanov et al. (Stefanov et al., 2014 ) combined a secure search and ORAM, where the keywords are kept confidential, but the search protocol still reveals the access pattern to the remote storage. To improve the searching performance, as one of the limitations of Song et al. (Song et al., 2000) , Goh (Goh, 2003) , and Chang and Mitzenmacher (Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005) proposed two new secure searching protocols with indexing. They constructed an index table alongside each set of data in the remote storage. The remote storage uses the index tables to find the matching data instead of checking every single encrypted data. Although (Goh, 2003; Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005) are efficient, their proposals leak access pattern to the untrusted parties.
Curtmola et al. (Curtmola et al., 2011 ) also presented a semantically secure search by using asymmetric data encryption, which is capable of finding desired data in sub-linear search time. In (Curtmola et al., 2011) , each user constructs an index, which includes every possible data that can appear in a query, then the index table is deterministically encrypted and outsourced to the remote storage. To perform a search, a user constructs a query that contains a token that is a deterministic function of the search data and sends the token to the remote storage. Then, the remote storage unit searches for the specific data in each set. Although the proposed searching technique is fast, it has two limitations: 1) users cannot update the index table of their data unless they generate the index table again, and 2) the searching technique still reveals the access pattern. To overcome the challenge of updating index table in (Curtmola et al., 2011) , Kamara et al. (Kamara et al., 2012) introduced an improvement, which enables updating the index table. However, the problem of revealing the access pattern is not addressed in that work. (Ding et al., 2017) proposes an efficient and secure search that supports top-k similarity search over encrypted data by using a random traversal algorithm. However, in (Ding et al., 2017) , users cannot evaluate their queries, but only the data owner. (Miyoshi et al., 2017) presents an efficient search technique over encrypted data that uses Bloom filter as the indexing technique. Although using Bloom filter introduces false-positive results, it makes the size of the indices very small and independent from the security parameter at the cost of leaking number of matches.
Boneh et al. introduced the first Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) (Boneh et al., 2004) , which was shown later that it leaks user's access pattern. Furthermore, (Boneh et al., 2004 ) is insecure against offline keyword guessing attack (Byun et al., 2006) . Boneh et al. proposed another PEKS (Boneh et al., 2007) , which is based on PIR (Chor et al., 1995) and Bloom filters, where the aim is to hide the access pattern. Although (Boneh et al., 2007) is secure, PIR-based schemes are computationally expensive. Moreover, in (Boneh et al., 2007 ) the number of matches that can be found in the remote storage is fixed beforehand to not leak the number of matches. To reduce the search overhead, Bellare et al. (Bellare et al., 2007) introduced an efficient publickey searchable encryption (ESE), which achieved an optimal search time. In contrast to PEKS, ESE allows other users to generate tokens and search for data in the remote storage unit only by having the public key. However, ESE encryption scheme is deterministic and vulnerable to brute-force attacks.
Sahai and Waters (Sahai and Waters, 2005) introduced a new encryption scheme called AttributeBased Encryption (ABE), which is capable of using an arbitrary string as the public key. In ABE, a ciphertext is not generated for a particular receiver, but for whom possess the desired attributes. In later works, Goyal et al. (Goyal et al., 2006) and Bethencourt et al. (Bethencourt et al., 2007) revised the ABE and introduced Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). Then, Han et al. (Han et al., 2014) proposed a new encryption scheme, Attribute-Based Encryption with Keyword Search (ABEKS), which enables a multi-user access control based on KP-ABE. In ABEKS, a token is generated by using user's private key, and it consists of the desired data to be searched in the remote storage unit. However, in (Han et al., 2014) search is realized through decryption of ciphertexts in the database, which introduces a significant computational overhead. Moreover, this technique requires generating a trapdoor, which necessitates collaboration with data owner. (Zhang et al., 2016) proposes a privacy-preserving ranked multikeyword search in a multi-owner model. This approach allows each data owner to use his private key for the encryption. However, this proposal suffers from the high computational cost of searching. Guo et al. (Guo et al., 2017) proposed a secure search that supports multiple data owners setting. (Guo et al., 2017 ) also enables rank search based on the relevance of documents and keyword, and quality of documents. They also propose an efficient indexing structure, group keyword balanced binary tree (GBB tree), to achieve higher efficiency in searching. However, in (Guo et al., 2017) , a trusted third proxy is used to facilitate data outsourcing and query evaluation. Moreover, the improvement over BB-tree leaks private information regarding access pattern. As it is stated in (Guo et al., 2017) , the GBB-tree may not access one or multiple subtrees to reduce computation overhead, which can reveal access pattern.
Chung et al. (Chung et al., 2010 ) introduced a secure outsourcing protocol based on Gentry's fully homomorphic encryption scheme (Gentry, 2009 ). Although in (Gentry, 2009 ) confidentiality of data is preserved, while data processing remains possible, its computational overhead is still a challenge. Li et al. (Li et al., 2012) proposed a method to apply homomorphic encryption with an overhead linear in the number of the records. Xiong et al. (Xiong et al., 2013) introduced a ciphertext-policy-ABE (CP-ABE) searchable encryption by using homomorphic encryption, where its search time is proportional to the size of the dataset. Bösch et al. (Bösch et al., 2012) proposed a scheme, BTH + , which is a combination of somewhat homomorphic encryption, and indexing technique of Chang and Mitzenmacher (Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005) . In Bösch's work (Bösch et al., 2012) , only the data owner can perform a search over the data, since generating trapdoor requires the possession of the private key.
Gentry et al. (Gentry et al., 2015) proposed a secure searching based on ORAM and Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) scheme. Although using ORAM in (Gentry et al., 2015) prevent information leakage in searching, it is communication-wise expensive. Popa et al. (Popa et al., 2012) introduced one of the most well-known solutions, CryptDB, for searching over encrypted data. CryptDB uses different encryption schemes depending on the type of the given query to be evaluated over encrypted data. However, CryptDB leaks the number of matches to the untrusted server. Moreover, in (Akin and Sunar, 2015) , the authors show that CryptDB is insecure because it does not provide integrity for the query. Krell et al (Krell et al., 2017) introduce another secure searching using ORAM, SHE, and Bloom filter that is significantly more efficient. However, they achieve such efficiency at the cost of leaking access pattern. Moreover, the work in (Krell et al., 2017) suffers from high storage complexity, where 100K of records each having four searchable keywords results in an encrypted index that using 75GB of RAM. Another drawback of (Krell et al., 2017) is that it requires the data owner to be online for searching. Table 1 summarizes the performance and security of the stateof-the-art searching techniques and our secure searching protocols. In Table 1 , we denote multi-reader and multi-writer setting as M-M, n is the total number of records, n a v is the number of records having the attribute a equal to v, d is the number of data owners, λ is a security parameter, and k stands for top-k documents as described in (Guo et al., 2017) . Note that, in contrast to the existing works, our proposal only addresses the problem of finding the matching records, not retrieving them. Thus, the current works and ours are not comparable concerning performance, communication/computation-wise.
SECURE SEARCHING PROTOCOLS
In this work, there are five parties: 1) users, 2) data storage units, 3) query issuer, 4) remote computation system, and 5) key manager: i) Key Manager (KM): KM generates a pair of public and private keys and shares the public key with the other parties. KM also collaborates with RCS to perform two-party computations such as secure decryption.
ii) Users: They are the owners of private data (patients) that are stored in remote data storage in encrypted form. The users send their measurements to the corresponding vendors. The data is consisting of several attributes, denoted by p i . Therefore, the users' data structure is a tuple (Paillier, 1999) , and a fully homomorphic scheme, Fan-Vercanteren (FV) (Fan and Vercauteren, 2012 ). Our system is designed under the assumption of semi-honest security model (Goldreich, 2004) . In our setting, the aim is to protect private data of users and QI from both KM and RCS, which are semi-trusted, during the evaluation of the query q provided by QI. The results of queries are kept hidden from KM and RCS.
IBSvI
Searching in IBSvI consists of two phases: First, we generate indices, which is done before the execution of the protocol (off-line phase) and second, we invoke the searching protocol upon receiving the query q from QI (on-line phase).
Generating Indices
Indices are constructed in four steps: 1. Users change the measurements of each attribute p z , z ∈ {0, · · · , α − 1} to binary form (p z ) i , where i ∈ {0, · · · , e ≤ − 1} and e is the bit-length of p z . Then, they assign zero to the rest of bits from (p z ) e to (p z ) −1 . 3. RCS creates an index for each possible attribute (there are Max α attributes in total), where each index has ω rows that is the total number of tuples collected from DSUs and columns.
RCS locates each encrypted tuple [(T p z ) i, j ]
(i th bit of the j th tuple received from DSUs) in the corresponding generated index, index
We present values in the binary form to check whether each encrypted data stored by RCS matches a particular encrypted data in q without invoking any two-party protocol. Each value is multiplied by powers of 2 to eliminate false positive results in our construction. Protocol 1 shows the steps that RCS takes to generate indices. It indicates that Max α indices are created, one for each attribute. According to Protocol 1, it is explicit generating indices in RCS is computationfree and storage-demanding. Create index p z 3:
for i = 0 to − 1 do 4:
end for 7:
end for 8: end for
Secure Searching
Protocol 2 shows the process of evaluating an encrypted query [q] over the encrypted databases using the generated indices.
1. QI I f 1 : Once RCS generates the indices, QI constructs a query q including e ≤ α attributesṕ z , z ∈ {0, · · · , e − 1}, which QI is interested in. Similar to the process of index generation, QI converts the values of its attributes to binary form. Then it Protocol 2: IBSvI.
and assigns zero to {(ṕ z ) e , · · · , (ṕ z ) −1 }.
RCS I f 1
: RCS tosses a random coin r for each pair of (index
Note that the values of index p z i, j is in encrypted form. Thus, to compute index p z i, j ⊕ (r * 2 i ), RCS checks whether r = 0, index . However, there is a possibility of obtaining false positive result. Thus, RCS chooses α uniformly distributed random number r z , z ∈ {0, · · · , α − 1} and another random number θ. r z values are used in the protocol to decrease the false positive rate and θ is used for the security reasons.
RCS I f 4
: In this step RCS choose ω uniformly random numbersý j ∈ {0, · · · , 2 −1 } and another random numberŕ. In this step, RCS inserts ω random numbers, which hasŕ zeros, to [y] . This step prevent the KM to learn about the number of matches and other statistical information from y j values. 
IBSvII
In IBSvII, we achieve a communication cost-free searching algorithm. Similar to IBSvI, there are two phases in IBSvII, indexing and searching. The index tables generation phase is identical to IBSvI except we do not multiply (p z ) i by 2 i .
Protocol 3 In IBSvII, we can use batching to reduce the computational overhead. Batching enables not only the addition of two packed ciphertexts but also supports multiplication. Thus, all the operations stated in Protocol 3 can be performed over packed ciphertexts without collaboration with KM.
SECURITY ANALYSES
We consider the semi-honest security model (Goldreich, 2004) , where parties are assumed to be honest in following the protocol description, while they are curious to obtain more information than they are entitled to. Given that the only RCS gets is the encrypted output from the protocol, KM should not be able to distinguish if RCS has a different input and RCS should not learn more information than the output of the protocol. We also assume that parties do not collude with each other.
Security of IBSvI
), and f = (RCS I f , KM I f ) to be the PPT functionality for IBSvI. The view of the ith party (i ∈ {RCS, KM}) during the execution of IBSvI on (index p z , φ) and security parameter n is denoted by view IBSvI
, where w ∈ {index p z , φ} based on the values of i, r i are the ith party internal random numbers, and m i j represents the jth message that is received by ith party. Note that KM does not have any initial input, thus its input is denoted as φ. out put IBSvI i (index p z , φ, n) represents the output of each party during the execution of IBSvI. To represent the joint output of both parties, we denote
Definition 4.1. It can be proven that IBSvI securely computes f = (RCS I f , KM I f ) in the semi-honest security setting if there exits PPT algorithms Sim RCS and Sim KM such that:
and
Theorem 1. The protocol IBSvI is simulation secure and securely computes the functionality f , when the party RCS is corrupted by adversary A RCS in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. We need to show that RCS cannot computationally distinguish between generated messages and outputs from S 2 and S 3 , and randomly generated data. 
5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSES Table 3 shows the computational complexity of our protocols for searching with multiple attributes (IBSvI and IBSvII). In Table 3 , we present x number of exponentiations with y-bit exponents as (x) y . As it is illustrated in Table 3 , the complexity of IBSvI in terms of the number of additions is linear to the number of attributes in q, bit-length of attributes, and the number of records in the database. Moreover, Table 3 shows how applying data packing reduces the number of homomorphic additions and decryptions. Table 3 also shows IBSvII does not require any encryption and decryption; however, it requires performing (2αω + αω)/ρ homomorphic multiplications, wherê ρ is the number of messages that can be packed by deploying batching. Table 4 summarizes the communicational complexity of the searching protocols in terms of data transmission, communication round, and storage complexity. According to Table 4 , communication round for IBSvI is constant, and it is independent of the bit-length of inputs and the number of attributes in q. Moreover, Table 4 shows that RCS in IBSvII computes Ans j without any communication with KM. Furthermore, data transmission needed is independent of the number of AND conjunctions used in the query. Table 4 shows the data transmission needed for the secure searching protocols per party, RCS, and KM, where the complexity of IBSvI is O(ω) and independent of the number of attributes. Recall that there is no communication between RCS and KM in IBSvII, and clearly, no data is transmitted between these two parties. The batching technique significantly reduces computational costs. Table 4 shows the size of each protocol's index table. The value ofρ depends of bitlength of , where smaller results in largerρ. 
Complexity Analysis

Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of implementing IBSvI and IBSvII. First, we show the run-times of the introduced searching protocols for different α and ϕ values. Then, we compare We applied a simple parallelization technique in our implementation (4 threads). The cryptographic key length of the Paillier is chosen according to NIST standards (Barker et al., 2007) , which are valid until 2030. Table 5 lists the parameters and their values in our implementation. Table 6 compares the run-times of the IBSvI, IBSvII, and existing works in RCS and KM. To show the trade-off between computational and communicational costs when using different encryption schemes, we also provide the run-time of IBSvI when FV is used, denoted as IBSvI FV . Note that Paillier cannot be used in IBSvII because it does not support the ciphertext multiplications. Table 6 points out both IBSvI Paillier and IBSvI FV demand significantly low computational resources from RCS. These results show that Paillier equipped with data packing and FV with enabled batching have the same performance in performing homomorphic addition. However, there is a noticeable difference between the run-times of IBSvI Paillier and IBSvI FV in RCS, which means the decryption function in FV is more efficient than Paillier because of being able to pack more messages into a single ciphertext,ρ >ρ. Table 6 presents the runtime of IBSvII that is roughly similar to the total runtime of IBSvI Paillier . Considering these results, we can conclude that, contrary to popular belief, using fully homomorphic crypto-schemes is more efficient than partially homomorphic ones in certain cases. Table 6 shows the run-time of secure searching in (Krell et al., 2017) , where only the cost of finding the matching records in that work is considered. According to Table 6 , the work in (Krell et al., 2017) is also efficient in finding the desired records at the costs of leaking access pattern with an index table size of 75 Gigabytes. Note that the network cost of searching is not provided separately in (Krell et al., 2017) ; therefore, we put the total network cost (searching and retrieving) in Table 6 . 
CONCLUSION
Searching in encrypted databases is a challenging task due to the complexity introduced by encryption. In this work, we focus on a medical setting where institutions would like to use the data collected by smart wearables from several vendors to analyze them for the well-being of the patients. In order to make the system usable in practice, we propose a two-step procedure: 1) creation of index tables at the time of uploading data from vendors to the cloud storage unit, and 2) executing queries using these tables. Our complexity analysis and experimental results on a large dataset clearly show the contribution of our work: the performance of the system is outstanding. It is also worth mentioning that our idea of creating index tables can be generalized to other application settings, introducing a scalable and efficient search mechanism for encrypted databases where data will later be processed under encryption.
